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Cold War Ruralism: civil defence planning, country ways and 
the founding of the UK’s Royal Observer Corps' fallout monitoring 
posts network 
 
Abstract  
1954 saw the first public detonation of an H-bomb, a weapon whose radioactive fallout 
challenged existing spatialised notions of targeting and post-attack recovery by making a 
whole country vulnerable to the vagaries of drifting toxic clouds that drew no distinction 
between urban centres and rural periphery. In response, the UK government established a 
network of 1,518 underground nuclear fallout monitoring posts spread uniformly across the 
country. This article considers how planning for this new reality brought a diffusion of cold 
war urban anxieties and ways of doing into the UK countryside, but in a way that was 
awkward and approximate.  
Keywords 
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This article considers the implications of the rise of the H-bomb for the United Kingdom’s 
experience during the 1950s of “cold war urbanism”, and that expression is taken here to 
encompass (1) the influence of cold war anxieties upon urbanists, their professional 
discourses and practices and (2) the production of built environments shaped by, or in 
service of cold war objectives. In short, cold war urbanism is how urbanists thought and 
built in response to the cold war. This article will pursue its investigation of the UK’s 
experience of cold war urbanism primarily by presenting a case study that considers the 
planning and implementation of one of the few conspicuously cold war motivated building 
schemes actually undertaken in the UK: the creation of a network of 1,518 underground 
nuclear fallout monitoring posts spread uniformly across the countryside.  
Situating urbanism & cold war urbanism 
In looking at the UK experience, and in turning scholarly attention to rural areas rather than 
urban centres, this article seeks to open-up a new perspective on the study of cold war 
urbanism. To date scholarship on cold war urbanism has mainly been presented in a North 
American context
1
, and has been conspicuously urban-centric
2
. At one level this is 
unsurprising, as (as its name would suggest) the urbanist discourse itself has always been 
avowedly urban-centric. Throughout the 20
th
 century urban growth was seen as a 
phenomenon needing evaluation and direction by dedicated urban-centric professionals: 
the urbanists. Whether in clearing slums, promoting ‘new towns’ or pioneering new, 
efficient road schemes urbanists’ mission and their professional identity was always 
directed towards urban centres.  However, this article will take urbanism to have become, 
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by the mid 20
th
 century, a pervasive mode of thinking about and implementing the planning 
and design of built environments per se and whose reach was not by then entirely confined 
to urban centres. 
By 1945, buoyed by an ascendant modernism and an unrivalled public appetite for state-led 
intervention in the wake of the command economy years of World War II, urbanists were 
well-placed to summon forth more efficient modes of settlement as part of post-war 
reconstruction, and they had a broad public mandate to unleash change upon urban-centres 
through sound planning, good design and technocratic unsentimentality. As Klemek has 
shown, on both sides of the Atlantic
3
 (though each via different processes) professional 
urbanists – and particularly planners – were in the ascendant and it was no surprise that 
others would soon see them as having a key role to play in responding to the threat of 
nuclear war that the rise of cold war tensions brought from 1948 onwards. Thus 
campaigning U.S. nuclear scientist Ralph Lapp could declare in 1949 that the American 
public’s future vulnerability lay “in the hands of city planners”
4
.  
The cold war urbanism thesis posits that the cold war’s real – albeit at times quite subtle 
and indirect – ideological and material impacts and influences can be detected in the 
discourse, collaborations and projects of urbanists (principally urban planners and 
architects) in the first two decades of the cold war. Over the last 15 years scholarship has 
sought to frame and to investigate the logics and effects of this cold war urbanism, and 
specifically to show how urbanists came to be co-opted into the cold war effort – on the 
home front at least. In an important – and early – contribution to this field Tobin
5
 showed 
how US postwar suburbanisation was at least in part facilitated by cold war concerns to 
decentralise both war production and residential settlement, so as to reduce the ease of 
Soviet targeting of existing urban concentrations of industry and population. This facilitation 
was subtle and not coercive, but acted out via a combination of fiscal incentives and 
discursive support. A good example of the latter is the US Congress approving legislation for 
a massive expansion of the interstate highway network in 1956 after its promoters ascribed 
city-evacuation and other defence benefits to the new infrastructure. Thus, both Farish
6
 and 
Light identify cold war urbanism as primarily a mutually reinforcing intellectual compact – 
with goals like population dispersal presenting as an opportunity for urbanists and defence 
intellectuals alike. As Light puts it:  
“During the 1940s and 1950s…civil defense initiatives offered important 
social settings for several groups – defense experts, atomic scientists, urban 
planners, and city managers – to come together in conversation about topics 
from highway planning to shelter design to future city form” 
7
  
Meanwhile Monteyne has shown how architects became willingly co-opted into shelter 
survey programmes and promoted shelter designs (e.g. as bunker architecture for civic 
buildings). In his account of the US’ experience of cold war urbanism Monteyne observes 
both that much of the activity was consumed in plan-making that never materialised in any 
particular building projects, and also that the US experience was “middle of the road”
8
, in 
comparison to the compulsory shelter building policies enacted in countries such as 
Switzerland and the Soviet Union and at the other pole – the zone of lesser activity than the 
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US – the ambivalence seemingly to the fore in the UK, where even less was actually 
implemented. 
The UK’s experience was not, however entirely passive to the cold war’s threat. In the 
period 1945 to 1955 the UK Government and its planners sought to interpret the cold war’s 
threats to the nation’s built environment, and how best to plan for, and materially respond 
to such threats, albeit within the nation’s constrained political, economic and geographical 
context. The ‘British way’ entailed considerable waves of strategic planning endeavour by 
many disciplines (some urbanist, others not), at least in the cold war’s first decade. This 
planning sought to understand – and to spatialise – the new realities likely to be presented 
by ever greater Soviet nuclear offensive capability, and to devise contingency plans of how a 
future war could be responded to on the home front. But, as Grant
9
 has noted, much of this 
activity was confined to paperwork – in the UK the physical implementation of cold war 
related building projects was very limited indeed, and in contrast to the US experience there 
were no surveys of the built environment seeking out shelter potential amongst existing 
building stock, and there was no protolyzing by institutions or individuals about shelter 
design and/or the dual purposing of conventional building projects. And there was certainly 
no actual programme of public shelter building.  
This instinct to plan for nuclear war needs consideration, as it appears to form the base-line 
for cold war urbanism, and an analysis of the UK experience of plan-making will be 
presented below. However, arguably the true test of the impact of the cold war upon 
urbanism should be an assessment of what was actually built, the practices by which that 
building was achieved and (in the UK experience at least) where that development actually 
occurred. And with regard to where, this article will show how the UK’s limited material 
response within the built environment to the threat of nuclear war often took place away 
from urban centres, and where it took the form of nuclear bomber bases, continuity of 
government bunkers (which have been extensively documented by others
10
) and in the 
underground nuclear fallout monitoring post network that will be the subject of this article’s 
case study. This apparent dislocation of the UK’s cold war urbanism – its decamping to the 
countryside –  in turn raises questions about what happens when urbanism is called upon to 
act away from urban centres and how its practices, concerns and preoccupations may 
manifest differently there and/or have to adapt. In short, it requires us to characterise a 
cold war ruralism as a previously under-explored variant of cold war urbanism. 
But before turning to the case study, we must set out the journey that leads to it. To do so 
we must first consider why in the late 1940s the UK actually seemed primed to develop a 
cold war urbanism more potent than that which scholars have charted in the US, and we 
must then explain why by the early 1950s (even before the rise of the H-bomb) that 
prospect had come to appear ever less likely. 
Understanding why cold war urbanism didn’t flourish in the UK 
As the Second World War drew to a close in 1945 Britain emerged from that conflict with 
urbanism in the ascendant, its rise fuelled by the “emergence of a mass consensus for 
planning”
11
. Schemes of inquiry between the wars had culminated in reports issued during 
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the war that were now set to feed directly into the incoming Labour (socialist) government’s 
political programme of delivering marked improvement of the social and urban realm by 
utilising all of the planning and command economy tools honed by the state during the war 
years. As Cherry put it, in this era planners felt valued, listened to and well-armed now as  
“a new machinery of government was established and far-reaching planning 
legislation provided the basis for a freshly devised planning system. A mood 
of post-war reconstruction charged planning with new responsibilities. The 
profession responded with new-found self confidence.”
12
  
Urban planning had – it seemed – politically come of age, the post-war welfare state 
consensus providing a driving engine for an energetic urbanism, expressing as both a now-
confident professional practice and a moral mission. And it was assumed that the New 
Jerusalem would largely be built by the state, and that money would be no object, as it 
“came to be argued that if weapons of war could be produced in such 
profusion, seemingly regardless of expense, then community facilities in the 
subsequent peace could not be denied; tanks, aircraft and ships would give 
way to houses, schools and hospitals, just as much by the effort of the state. 
By 1945 it could safely be assumed that government would continue to play a 
major role in directing the economy.”
13
  
The immediate post war years were therefore an era of “positive planning”
14
: with the 
planners leading the assault in urban renewal campaigns sweeping away the illogical clutter 
of the ad-hoc past. Nowadays we see spatial planning as balance-finding, amelioration, 
controlling externalities – rather than directive, but we need to appreciate that under high 
modernism it was intended to be directive, with the state and its local organs leading the 
way. In reflection of this the 1947 Town & Country Planning Act had framed development as 
essentially a plan- and local government-led process, specifically placing an emphasis on 
local government as the developer of most houses, schools, factories and shops (and under 
the oversight of central government strategic planners).  In this iteration of the spatial 
planning system it was assumed that the role of “negative planning” (planning control over 
private development) was but a minor feature of the system.  
The British post-war model then saw the state, and its planning activities, as the main agent 
of public betterment. Robert Fishman has defined planning as “collective action for common 
good”
15
. Working within a progressive urbanist lens, planning’s goal has always been 
improvement of the socio-spatial circumstances of a population, in short a project aimed at 
making things better. The modernism at the heart of the mid-20
th
 century planning ethos 
believed that improvement doesn’t happen within the built environment by accident, but 
instead through co-ordinated expert-enabled design. The post-war consensus (still) saw 
virtue in a “meliorist administrative state”
16
 that was “imposing rational new form on 
cities”
17
 fuelled by a faith in science and progress, and this was the era in which such 
schemes could actually be implemented (rather than just theorised). By the early 1950s 
British urban planning was technocratic rather than utopian – fuelled by functionalism, 
physical determinism and the experience of total war. Thus the ascendant, mid-century 
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planning instinct represented a modernist faith in the ability of the state to analyse and 
predict, so as to decide proactively how to provide for such improvement of the common 
good. But implicitly, a planning-driven urbanism that sought to make things better through 
technocratic foresight and intervention, also needed to mobilise the tools of planning in 
order to address threats which if unanticipated or unaddressed might otherwise make the 
common good worse. Furthermore, as Michel Foucault
18
 argued, the most fundamental 
provision that a state must ensure, in order to maintain its legitimacy, is the protection of its 
public (something that became increasingly difficult to promise in the era of thermonuclear 
war, as we will see below). 
The modernist planning instinct was thus particularly strongly conditioned in the UK to 
search for plan- and state-led solutions to the perceived problems of the day – for the reflex 
reaction of post-war planners was “something must be done”. The cold war’s risk of nuclear 
war was one such challenge for which planners were expected to find a solution. However, 
this challenge, and its escalating costs and potential scale of destruction, would eventually 
come to set the limit condition for the British state’s confidence in its ability to plan for the 
provident management of its population, and whether urban or rural.  
In acclimatising to the era under investigation we must appreciate that “planning” had a 
wider meaning and remit than we might ascribe to that term now.  The Second World War 
had been won at least in part through the British state taking unprecedented powers of 
direction over all aspects of social and economic life. During the war the civil service had 
doubled in size and new ministries of economic control had proliferated. Central 
government was full of economic and war planners exercising plan-led oversight and 
direction over a near-infinite range of industries, territories and resources. 
All of this planning had been in aid of the national war effort. Thus in rising to the new 
challenges posed by the cold war, planning for national defence in an atomic war was 
assumed to require holistic, multi-disciplinary plan-making in terms of both forecasting 
attack scenarios and the development of workable solutions to their effects. Thus attempts 
to predict and provide for civil defence in the face of nuclear threat was a type of planning, 
and one which clearly had spatial implications, but which was not exclusively concerned 
with the efficiency and direction of land-use per se. Accordingly, in examining the fate of 
cold war urbanism in the UK we must not overlook civil defence planning (or ‘home defence’ 
or ‘war’ planning as it might have been more familiarly characterised in the 1950s). Indeed it 
is this variant of planning that led to the creation of the network of monitoring posts to be 
considered in this article’s case study.  
At the end of the Second World War the assumption was that home defence would remain 
as important as military defence.  This was reflected in the Civil Defence Act 1948 which 
required local government bodies to plan and implement civil defence measures. It also 
established the voluntary Civil Defence Corps in 1949. By the end of the 1940s civil defence-
related planning measures included “evacuation planning, plans for the “due functioning” of 
essential industry and the creation of additional port facilities”
19
, all of which had important 
potential implications for urban and regional planning.   
7 
 
Civil defence planning and urban planning then, grew from the same roots and had a strong 
conceptual affinity. In particular, calls for the redistribution of urban centres and port 
capacity during the late 1940s and into the 1950s (to reduce the vulnerability of the UK to 
urban-centred atomic bombs targeting the few key conurbations) fitted well with the inter-
war era’s anxieties about the so-called “the regional problem”
20
 of uneven industrial and 
economic fortunes as reflected in the Barlow Royal Commission (established 1937, reporting 
1940) – on The Distribution of the Industrial Population). Indeed, an express link had been 
made in the Civil Defence Act of 1939, which had imposed a duty on urban and regional 
planners to avoid dangerous concentrations of population. Civil defence planners’ calls for 
dispersal of industrial and ports capacity persisted throughout the 1950s, with the 1955 
Strath Report
21
 (which we will discuss below) avowing a faith in a substantive dispersal of 
government and industry as “the only sure means of reducing economic risk from hydrogen 
bombing”
22
, albeit that such pronouncements increasingly took on an unrealistic – 
undeliverable – air. 
Through such anxieties about the vulnerabilities of built-up areas to bombing we see a 
continuation of pre-nuclear anxieties into the cold war era. Initial attempts to appraise the 
A-bomb threat sought to view it as an intensification of conventional city bombing
23
, 
reappraisal in 1953
24
 saw the validity of this approach challenged and then comprehensively 
overthrown by the Strath report in the wake of the rise of the H-bomb. In this succession of 
attempts to model and plan for the effect of a nuclear war upon the UK’s built environment, 
the scale of destruction increasingly targeted at urban centres took planners to the limits of 
their imagination, and beyond the limits of their ability to provide for solutions through 
planning: the evacuations that their plans envisaged could never work beyond the confines 
of their convenient reality-simplifying assumptions. In the cold war era planners found 
themselves asked to contemplate the ultimate contingency – a thermonuclear war, and the 
extreme exceptionality of this contingency would prove to be a fundamental challenge to 
the ascendancy of the planning ethos in the post-war era. Indeed, even at the dawn of the 
atomic age, in the aftermath of the 1945 bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, planners had 
to grapple with a fundamental step change: that a single A-bomb would be likely to produce 
the same number of fatalities as the 60,595 deaths caused by all enemy air raids over Britain 
during the entirety of the 1939-45 war, and that just six A-bombs would produce the same 
amount of housing damage caused by five years of German bombing.  As Matthew Grant
25
 
has shown, during the 1950s the rapidly developing power and number of nuclear bombs 
likely to be targeted at the UK (alongside recurrent post-war financial crises) increasingly 
outstripped the ability of planners to plan for the defence of the UK population, two thirds 
of whom were living in towns of 50,000 or more by the 1950s. 
This impracticability in turn led to an erosion of the UK government’s commitment to (and 
funding of) civil defence during the 1950s – with post-war planners’ efforts to provide for 
systems of national ‘recovery’ (i.e. restoration to pre-attack conditions) giving way from 
1954 to a more modest aspiration of a ‘best efforts’ support of ‘life saving’ (i.e. ameliorating 
some of the otherwise irreversible changes inflicted by the attack). Then in 1957 this finally 
gave way to the bare provision of a ‘control system’: an attempt to perpetuate a semblance 
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of martial governance (and nuclear retaliation capability), but without the promise of 
assistance to affected citizens.  
At the same time that Britain’s civil defence planners were anxiously considering what could 
be done to respond to cold war threats, urban planners were setting to work to implement 
the fruits of their urban and regional plan-making. But there proved to be little cross-over 
between the two endeavours. The roll out of post-war urbanism appears to have been little 
influenced or affected by cold war anxieties. Thus even as regards the desirability of 
industrial and residential dispersal, an issue that had striking similarities of goal between 
civil defence and urban and regional planners, we see little if any co-option of civil defence 
justifications in support of urban and regional planning projects.  
Thus, without cross-referencing civil defence planners’ goals, British urbanists pursued 
residential and industrial dispersal projects for their own ends.  On the residential side, 
urbanists energetic implementation of the New Towns Act 1946, saw eight new settlements 
founded to transfer population away from London by 1951, echoing the spirit (if not the 
numbers) of Sir Patrick Abercrombie’s 1944 Greater London Plan
26
 which had recommended 
the relocation of over 1 million people out of London in order to achieve a reduced 
population density, both in London and in the New Towns. But then in the 1950s the 
construction of the New Towns faltered, with urbanists’ power reducing somewhat 
(although it recovered again in the 1960s). This was in part due to political control having 
passed to a Conservative administration who favoured a less directive approach, and who 
introduced the more facilitative Town Development Act 1952 in its place, which sought to 
encourage the growth of smaller towns at a distance form big cities. Meanwhile in pursuit of 
industrial dispersal, urbanists facilitated state led initiatives under the Distribution of 
Industry Act 1945 (which picked up the Barlow Commission agenda of dispersing industry 
away from London and the South East). But this dispersal agenda was employment-driven 
and also took an increasingly old fashioned view of what industry was, applying no controls 
on the service sector or office developments (concentrations of economic and human 
capital who in civil defence terms were equally in need of dispersal). Like the New Towns, 
industrial dispersal saw the bulk of its activities and successes in the late 1940s, and by the 
early 1950s the amount of effort and money spent state-constructed industrial estates and 
factories under this dispersal policy had already markedly reduced amidst the change of 
political and social tone, and the lesser regard accorded to planners and planning by the 
public in the 1950s. 
An early example of urban and regional planners’ apparent ambivalence towards civil 
defence related dispersal considerations is the fate of an application in 1948 for a new 
power station to be built at Poplar, East London close to the docks, dense population and 
existing electricity generation plant. As Grant shows, such citing was the polar-opposite of 
what the civil planners were then recommending in terms of dispersal of likely targets away 
from urban centres. The development was opposed as foolhardy by the Air Ministry, but it 
went ahead anyway, the realities of post war need and convenience having won the day 
over cold war anxious contingencies. For Grant “Poplar demonstrated the inability of 
defence planners to override economic policy-makers”.
27
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With such bruising civil defence planners perhaps saw little reason to seek the support of 
urbanists in the development of their own schemes, and of which few saw any physical 
implementation. Throughout the 1950s the Government wrestled with the conundrums of 
evacuation in time of war. Such policies were considered to be more affordable than those 
of constructing shelters, but very difficult to plan operationally. Implementing evacuation 
would have required local authorities to survey every business in their area to determine 
which firms were essential (and for whom the workers should be excluded from 
evacuation). Meanwhile, the construction of shelters within new buildings was generally 
thought a good idea, but very expensive of money and materials, and labour too for it would 
have also have required a force of surveyors to police that construction requirement. 
Neither policy progressed beyond paper-based discussion at central government level. Only 
the Port Emergency Scheme can be presented as a successful – and implemented –  
instance of a civil defence instigated development scheme.  This saw a programme of 
central government investment to reduce dependency on the ports of London and Liverpool 
by improving facilities and anchorages around the coast. Planning work for this scheme was 
complete by 1951 and its implementation was largely achieved by end of 1953 (although 
with some delays due to steel shortages). But, by the time of its completion the scheme was 
arguably already redundant. The goal had been to secure Britain’s ability in the wake of an 
atomic attack to continue to supply its military forces fighting Soviet forces on the European 
continent, and to continue receiving imports of food and other vital resources. But by the 
early 1950s defence planners had already concluded that, even with the benefit of the port 
dispersal scheme, in the event of a nuclear strike the UK would cease to be capable of either 
activity. 
In the first 10 years of the cold war responsibility for civil defence planning lay with the UK 
central government’s Home Office, and its plan writing continued to attempt to address the 
unthinkable, and to lobby for civil defence funding, but it did so in the face of the Ministry of 
Defence’s increasing pessimism about the cost effectiveness of civil defence (the military 
instead putting their faith – and the bulk of funds allocated to addressing the Soviet nuclear 
threat – into Britain’s nuclear weapons and the policy of deterrence via mutually assured 
destruction). This intra-governmental tension came to a head in 1956 where in a six month 
period civil defence funding received a near fatal mauling in a round of emergency 
government cuts, falling from £70M to £30M and then remaining below £20M p.a. for the 
following five years. Set in this context civil defence’s achievements after 1956 could only 
ever be tokenistic and only elements of civil defence that could be justified as supporting 
the nuclear deterrent could be taken forward as development projects. Furthermore, by 
1956 – as we are about to see – the rise of the H-bomb had made everything even harder to 
plan or provide for given rapidly increasing number and power of nuclear weapons, the 
relative geographical smallness and the population density of the UK, its proximity to the 
European theatre of war and its own primary target status as the European home of the 
UK’s and the US’ atomic bomber fleets. The rise of the H-bomb also opened-up 
opportunities for opponents of civil defence to undermine it at local government level, as 
was the case when in April 1954 Coventry City Council announced cessation of all civil 
defence measures, the Town Clerk having declared it to be a waste of public time and 
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money in the face of the recent announcement of the first publicised testing of a hydrogen 
bomb
28
. 
When the H-bomb came 
On the 1
st
 March 1954 the United States had detonated a 15 megaton (MT) thermonuclear 
hydrogen bomb (codenamed ‘Castle Bravo’) at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. Whilst not 
the world’s first thermonuclear detonation (the US’ first test had been carried out secretly 
in 1952), this highly publicised event sent shock waves around the world, as that detonation 
(an explosion 1,000 times greater than that of the Hiroshima bomb) ushered in a new scale 
of nuclear destruction. Whilst atomic bombs (fission devices of the type used upon 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945) could be conceptualised as anti-urban munitions, H-bombs 
(powered by thermonuclear fusion) were quickly revealed to be not only anti-metropolitan 
in the range of their explosive effects but also regional (and potentially nation-crossing) in 
their ensuing atmospheric pollution effects. Even a small H-bomb, it was revealed, could 
easily lay waste to an entire city, with a five MT detonation destroying housing within a 
three mile radius of ground zero, and setting off a firestorm consuming the combustible 
residue within much of that zone.
29
 
In addition to its massively enhanced explosive force, the H-bomb brought with it new 
effects: radioactive fallout. The effects of nuclear detonations would no longer be localised 
effects confined to the site of detonation. Instead they would inflict a new, mobile and 
unpredictable regional effects. This was brought to public consciousness in 1954 through 
press reports of the experience of the 23-man crew of the Japanese fishing boat, the Lucky 
Dragon, which found itself unwittingly exposed on the high seas to Castle Bravo’s fallout 
cloud at a point 82 miles from ground zero. Seven crew members were hospitalised, and six 
months later, Aikichi Kuboyama – the ship’s radio operator – died from radiation poisoning 
after an agonizing (and publicly observed) illness.  
As Peter Sloterdijk has noted, the 20
th
 century saw the rise of a new form of anxiety – that 
related to threat from the air (“the Atmoterrorist Model”
 30
). The first world war had seen 
the opening-up of the sky as a new arena of warfare, and in the form of poison gas had 
hinted at the lethal potentiality of atmosphere itself. The H-bomb marked a new chapter in 
this development. The H-bomb fallout problem came at a time when UK population and 
policy makers were already sensitised to atmospheric pollution
31
 – the great smog of 
December 1952 had shown how polluted air could kill (at least 4,000 fatalities and 100,000 
made ill), and would lead via the ensuing 1956 Clean Air Act to the imposition of a step-
change in urban fuel use with the technocrats introducing comprehensive restrictions on 
the burning of fossil fuels within designated “smoke free zones”, and mandating new 
technologies (smokeless fuels).  The problem of how to respond to fallout and its mobile 
effects sent governments into an equivalent flurry but the findings were far less palatable, 
even in the highpoint of interventionist urbanism. Towards the end of 1954 a secret 
committee was set up under civil servant William Strath to report on The Defence 
Implications of Fall-Out from a Hydrogen Bomb, and Strath’s committee presented their 
findings to the government in March 1955. 
11 
 
Interim advice issued to the Cabinet in November 1954 mapped out the harsh predications 
of blast and fallout from a 10 MT H-bomb detonation
32
. Radiation released from this single 
detonation would affect an area of 5,000 to 6,000 square miles: with an inner zone of 
around 270 square miles in which radiation would be so powerful that all life would be 
extinguished. Outside this area the danger would progressively lessen with distance – but 
with a fallout plume of radioactive debris sucked up into the atmosphere, likely to be 170 
miles long and 20 wide in average wind conditions. Anyone caught out of doors within this 
plume within the first day after the blast would be likely to receive a lethal radiation 
exposure. 
As Strath’s report subsequently concluded: a “hydrogen bomb war would be total war in a 
sense not hitherto conceived. The entire nation would be the frontline”
33
 as just ten 10 MT 
air-bursts close to the western seaboard would via the agency of the prevailing winds  
contaminate much of the UK mainland and render “normal” life impossible (and with life 
and property obliterated by blast and fire on a vast scale). Furthermore, thousands of 
square miles of agricultural land (and their standing crops) and open water supplies would 
also be rendered useless.  
Thus the harm inflicted by an H-bomb needed to be assessed meterologically – for it 
represented an interaction with complex natural atmospheric processes, producing an 
uncertain, mobile and not at all urban-centric lethality. This fundamentally changed the risk-
geography that the civil defence planners would have to grapple with, for now: 
“the threat of fallout necessitated a reconceptualization of the British state: 
now for war planning purposes it had to be imagined as a series of zones of 
contamination risk mapped by imagined fall-out plumes in a “hyper-real” 
post-attack topography”
34
. 
The implications were clear (and noted on both sides of the Atlantic) as US Federal Civil 
Defense Administrator, Val Peterson, in conference with state and city officials in December 
1954 had already publicly conceded, in the event of nuclear war “there is no farmer or 
rancher who may not be right in the middle of the fallout”
35
, and their ground and crops 
would be rendered toxic. The most dangerous long-term by-product of an H-bomb 
explosion would be the Strontium 90 fraction of its radiation, because of its relatively long 
half-life of 28 years and its propensity to accumulates in the food chain through uptake in 
plants, and onward through cows and their milk and into human bone. 
In 1958, after working upon it in secret for three years, and with the Prime Minister and his 
Cabinet wavering during that period over what and when to release information to the 
public about fallout and what could be done about it in terms of civil defence
36
, the UK 
Government finally published, 'Home Defence and the Farmer', guidance to British farmers 
on the threats of fallout
37
. The publication publicly acknowledging that the peril of H-bombs 
extended far beyond the range of their explosive effects and also (even more tellingly) 
admitted that (even after those three years of rumination) “knowledge about the effect of 
fall-out in farms is still incomplete”. Couched in the clipped, officious language of the time 
this admission featured an implicit assurance to the reader that a technocratic solution to 
12 
 
this new problem would be found soon. But this reassurance was hollow, amidst the 
planners’ growing pessimism about their ability to offer salvation. Tellingly, the remainder 
of the document then instructs the lone farmer on how best to try to protect himself, his 
crops and livestock by his own efforts – as reflecting civil defence’s post Strath lurch to a 
“self-help” posture, at least as regards civilian protection. 
Notably a paragraph in the farmers’ finalised guidance strove to encourage peacetime 
configuration of new farm buildings to incorporate principles that would also assist in the 
event of nuclear war, thus: 
“Even the layout of buildings, yards and roads would help, not only in peace 
time but in fall-out conditions in war time. A good layout would help the 
farmer and his men to reduce the time spent out of doors and so minimise 
the dose of radiation they might receive. So efficient farming is not only in 
the national interest and the farmers’ interest in peace time, but it is a way 
[also] of preparing for safer farming if another war should occur.” 
Here we see the civil defence planners acknowledging that the countryside has its built 
environments too, and that to be persuasive planning for civil defence needs to be linked 
(somehow) to the exigencies and logics of peace time operations (because the 
contingencies of war alone are insufficient incentive to change). This urging for spatial 
efficiency in the development and use of farm buildings also smacks of urbanism’s quest for 
improvement of urban environments through purposive designs. It is a sign of cold war 
urbanism’s penetration into the countryside. 
Strath implicity, and 'Home Defence and the Farmer' explicitly, signalled that nuclear 
warfare could no longer be conceptualised in an urban-centric manner. The threat posed by 
thermonuclear war was not just that of urban destruction, it was now nation-wide, and that 
this included the countryside that lies between urban centres. In the light of such 
pronouncements it was clear that planning to address the effects of nuclear war was not 
solely a matter of urban defence, and there would be a need to develop a system of warning 
and monitoring that could address this meteorological, dynamic, whole-country situation 
posed by fallout. Set against this backdrop any neat binary equating “urban” with target and 
“rural” as safe fell away. Rigid separation of town and country has always been simplistic, 
but fallout sharply emphasised this. Even before the rise of the H-bomb portions of the 
countryside were co-opted into the service of urban areas, or targets in their own right, for 
example as bomber bases. These alone summoned the prospect of 70 nuclear strikes upon 
the countryside, for in the 1950s the UK Government’s publicised policy was to disperse 
nuclear bombers to over 70 airfields around the country in time of crisis.  
Situating cold war ruralism 
This article’s case study will observe the manner in which Britain’s civil defence planners 
turned their attention to the countryside in the search for a solution to country-wide peril 
now posed by fallout. In looking at how the UK’s cold war planners devised and 
implemented their programme to build over 1,500 nuclear fallout monitoring posts in 
response to the challenge of the H-bomb, the case study will show how a cold war ruralism 
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was forged where the imperatives of cold war urbanism met the tempering forces of the 
countryside, at least as regards the insertion of the numerous but individually small ROC 
posts.  
As signalled at the start of this article, by the 1950s urbanism was not entirely confined to 
urban-centres, it had become more universalistic in aspiration. Indeed an early theorist of 
urbanism, Louis Wirth
38
 had defined urbanism in 1938 as a mode of living, which whilst 
typified by the urban density of cities, was not exclusively found there. Wirth’s formulation 
presented urbanism as a condition of modernity, and argued that urbanism’s characteristics 
of mobility, heterogeneity, transitory relationships and acting through groups might be 
found not only in urban settings, but also beyond the city because urbanism’s mode of living 
has a tendency to act outward upon its periphery drawing the spatially non-urban into 
urbanism’s orbit (and co-opting it into service of the urban). Thereby – where necessary to 
the interests of modernism and the metropolitan realm – the non-urban becomes infected 
with urbanist ways and priorities. In a material sense this is what the ROC post project 
entailed, for at its inception this network was still largely justified as an urban-defence 
measure. This physical encroachment points to a symbiotic relationship between certain 
uses of rural land and the sustenance (or defence) of the urban. It also appears to reflect 
Shirley’s
39
 conceptualisation of the countryside as a continuum within which corridors and 
outposts of urban-supporting apparatus and modes of living penetrate. Shirley illustrates 
her argument by reference to roads, but the ROC posts fit the mould too.  
This symbiotic connection is nothing new, but it is something that was repeatedly 
suppressed in conventional representations of the countryside circulating in the mid 1950s. 
Accordingly, in 1955 pioneering landscape historian W.G. Hoskins could write scathingly of a 
blighted cold war ruralism in which “Constable’s and Gainsborough’s sky” was sullied by the 
atom-bomber and of the “England of the Nissen hut, the ‘pre-fab’ and the electric fence, of 
the high barbed wire around some unmentionable devilment”
40
, in doing so implying these 
to be recent, unnecessary and reversible accretions. Studies to date of the impact of the 
cold war upon the British countryside have tended to perpetuate this separatist or aesthetic 
view of the rural. At its simplest the urban is seen as the locus of modern warfare and the 
countryside a place of retreat from it. This cold war pastoralism is can be found in arts and 
humanities scholarship that seeks to capture the special (often abandoned) effects of cold 
war infrastructure upon rural sites
41
. These studies hold a latent view that the countryside is 
being sullied by military encroachment. Meanwhile others have ventured onto rural military 
sites to examine military-ecological interactions
42
, and once again from the point of view 
that the military presence is an encroachment, rather than a longstanding – and necessary – 
feature of the countryside.  
Each of these approaches has their virtues, but they also each (in their own ways) 
perpetuate a view of the impact of the cold war upon the built environment that presents it 
as qualitatively or quantitatively different in the countryside compared to that in urban 
centres. They also lose sight of the ubiquity and mundanity of infrastructural-urban 
incursions into the countryside (for instance reservoir construction, motorways and trunk 
roads, or electricity pylons), and of the ready absorption of these urban-serving tendrils into 
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the rural landscape and its standard practices of place management. These studies also tend 
to foreground the most dramatic military sites (and whether in terms of their architecture 
or deadly purpose). By eschewing the offensive military sites and the continuation of 
government bunkers in favour of the physically more modest ROC post network this article 
therefore is a response to Grant’s call for studies of the cold war and its history to balance 
up previous concerns to unearth and expose the conspiracies and exceptional concrete 
structures of the secret state by explicating the “hitherto unknown normalcy”
43
 of the cold 
war and its impacts upon places.  
Planning the ROC’s fallout monitoring role 
Whilst the largest UK cold war instigated building project (by number of sites at least) the 
ROC post programme entailed insertion of small, individual concrete chambers into over 
1,500 rural localities (often situated – for accessibly – at the edge of playing grounds or 
arable fields). Taken together these posts formed a national monitoring network, but due to 
the requirement for them to be spread out grid-like across the face of the country, each 
individual post was isolated, a modest lone cold war totem each set approximately seven to 
ten miles distance from its neighbouring posts. As we shall see, for that reason it was quite 
exposed (both physically and socially) to the pressures of its local and non-cold war focussed 
circumstances. But briefly before doing so, we must explain how the ROC came to be given 
its new monitoring role. 
The arrival of the H-bomb proved to be timely for the Royal Observer Corps. Established in 
the inter-war years, the Corps (a volunteer service affiliated to the Royal Air Force) had 
provided a network of aircraft spotters and plotters during the Second World War, helping 
to supplement radar particularly regarding inland, low altitude aircraft movements. The ROC 
was stood down at war’s end in 1945, only to be reactivated a few months later as cold war 
tensions emerged. Stationed in predominantly rural, above-ground look-out posts the ROC 
had literally watched the skies, the ROC were trained to spot and plot a new generation of 
aircraft, but the increased speed and altitude of jet aircraft, and the further development of 
radar technology threatened the relevance of the ROC by the mid 1950s (with the 
subsequent rise of ballistic missile technology in the late 1950s further undermining this 
role). Air Ministry records reviewed at the National Archives for this study show that in the 
early 1950s the ROC limped on as an organisation increasingly in need of something to do. 
The advent of the H-bomb and its fallout threat, proved to be its salvation, for in 1955 the 
Strath report called for a national warning and monitoring organisation be established to 
gather and co-ordinate nuclear blast detection, and for the measurement and the plotting 
of fallout plumes, as a key response to the H-bomb threat. 
In advance of Strath’s report, the Home Office had also been trying to work out what to do 
about fallout. In 1953, it had begun a series of studies to investigate how to record the fall 
of A-bombs, spread of fires and general conditions on the ground and potential 
development of  ‘Regional Observation Posts’
44
 situated around the peripheries of likely 
target areas. At first they had considered such monitoring to be a task suited to fire brigades 
as part of the air raid warning system, for the likely zone of effects were thought to be 
almost exclusively urban in nature. The ROC had been discounted, because its observation 
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network was largely rural. But the rise of anxieties about how to respond to the H-bomb’s 
fallout saw the ROC’s rurality suddenly transformed from a negative into a positive feature. 
A Home Office file
45
, titled “ROC as fallout monitors” charts this reversal of fortunes, which 
begins with the ROC being sent a copy of the account of a two-day workshop aimed at 
exploring the consequences of fallout, which was held at the Civil Defence Staff College, 
Sunningdale in February 1955. The civil defence planners’ simulation postulated a 10 MT 
bomb exploding at ground level in the north-west corner of Birmingham. A fallout plume 
was then calculated to have spread eastwards, reaching Great Yarmouth nine hours after 
the detonation. The plume was marked via four ellipses – each defined to represent a 
particular level of radiation exposure hazard.  
The narrative for the exercise
46
 notes that “the information on weapon effects at present 
available [is] sketchy and could not be relied upon”, (and furthermore that the exercise’s 
assumption of a single H-bomb detonation did not reflect the reality of multiple targeting). 
It was noted also that this was the “first study of its kind on the problem of fall-out” and 
that “there are no plans yet formulated” upon how to respond to this new challenge. This 
was therefore a simulation through which the planners hoped to learn what to do. 
Evacuation was shown to be impracticable and thus sheltering from the plume until it 
changed direction and/or radiation levels subsided was shown to be the most practicable 
response: thus buildings attained a new significance, offering the prospect of now-vital 
shelter from fallout even in peripheral areas unlikely to be within the range of a weapon’s 
urban-centric, built environment destroying blast and fire effects. And understanding how 
the plume and its radioactivity was dynamically changing (and where and for how long to 
shelter indoors) required a monitoring network that could cover the whole country and 
which would be resilient enough to survive the nuclear blasts. It became clear that any hope 
of national survival depended upon knowing how the fallout plumes were behaving and in 
1956 the UK Warning & Monitoring Organisation (UKWMO) was established to co-ordinate 
this role. In May of that year the ROC was identified as the best-suited organisation to take 
on the monitoring role, as UKWMO’s field force. 
Tracing cold war ruralism within the implementation of the ROC post programme 
The case study now presented considers how the ROC fallout monitoring programme was 
implemented and in examining this seeks to identify both how civil defence planners 
projected urbanist methods and concerns onto the British countryside, and how in turn 
countryside ways came to act back upon that encroachment so as to produce a further 
diluted UK experience of cold war urbanism: cold war ruralism.  
Pruitt
47
 has contended that law’s remit within the countryside is necessarily vaguer due to 
the absence of urban solidarity and its constant reinforcement of discursive systems and 
conformity to them. Something similar may be said of the writ of the cold war planners: that 
the countryside was harder to systematise than were the urban centres. Instead 
implementation of any plans or body of ideas in the sparcely populated countryside is likely 
to be slower, more approximate and more exposed to the confounding factors of other local 
priorities and influences. In the following discussion of the physical implementation of the 
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ROC’s new role and construction of the subterranean “protected accommodation” provided 
to support it, we will encounter examples of these effects and in doing so glimpse cold war 
ruralism as a set of practices and accommodations, characterised by a certain level of 
pragmatism. 
We will spend most of our time dissecting the roll-out of the ROC posts’ protected 
accommodation, but before doing so can draw some instructive insights from a slightly 
earlier attempt to modernise the ROC and its sites – a scheme that saw a direct incursion of 
urbanist building methods into the heart of the countryside. 
Upon reactivation of the ROC in January 1947 many of the wartime lookout posts were 
found to be in a dilapidated condition (these often having been hastily improvised wooden 
structures assembled by enthusiastic volunteers rather than a co-ordinated national 
construction programme). Accordingly
48
, early in 1951 the Air Ministry had sought tenders 
from industry to provide purpose-built accommodation: shelter from elements, and a 
stable, level platform from which to track passing aircraft. Orlit Ltd were contracted to 
supply prefabricated shelters, with factory-made precast concrete sections being designed 
and supplied by Orlit in a manner that suited transport to often remote sites. Orlit had 
produced thousands of air raid shelters during the Second World War and was by 1951 
involved in the prefab (replacement housing) programme in the immediate post war period. 
In addition to these physical works, the programme also saw the Air Ministry taking steps to 
legally regularise and/or extend land agreements for existing sites or to relocate sites to 
more favourable positions.  
Thus in this project we see the Air Ministry embracing a centralised, rationalistic “tidying 
up” of local wartime-era improvisation, both as to procurement and physical construction, 
very much embracing the “system building” ethos of urbanist high modernism. Orlit 
commenced construction of the “Orlit Visual Reporting Post” in 1952, with the precast 
panels then erected by local construction firms – pinning or bolting the precast panels 
together to form one or other of two standardised configurations: Type A (structure laid 
directly on the ground) and Type B (platform raised on four 6 feet legs). 413 Orlit posts 
produced (207 of Type A and 206 of Type B) with construction concluded by 1956 (by which 
time these structures were already redundant: the ROC’s engagement in aircraft tracking 
already at an end in all but the east coast, and its vulnerable nuclear airbases).  
Furthermore, by 1956 attention was already turning to the construction of subterranean 
protected accommodation at ROC post sites to enable the ROC to take on its blast and 
fallout monitoring role. The ROC’s existing sites would be used wherever possible, and 
suitable protected accommodation would be installed at them. Nuclear test conducted by 
the US (at Nevada) and the UK (at the Montebello Islands, in Australia) had shown that 
shelter underground could act as protection against blast waves and also against fallout. It 
was therefore decided that the ROC would need underground bunkers (known as protected 
accommodation) from which to undertake their monitoring and reporting activities.  
By May 1956 the Home Office had decided its requirements for the protected 
accommodation. These would comprise a rectangular concrete box (measuring 19ft x 8ft 6in 
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x 7ft 6in), divided into a ladder well (leading down 15ft from the post’s access hatch), a 
small toilet compartment and a main room combining working and sleeping 
accommodation for the four-man crew. The structure would be formed in situ in an 
excavation and then backfilled and domed with 3 feet of earth. It would be served by 
manual ventilation, battery powered lighting and a telephone line connecting it to the 
outside world. The walls, and ceiling would be over 6 inches thick
49
. Thus in good urbanist 
fashion, the design of the protected accommodation would be standardised (although, 
unlike the Orlit posts it would not be prefabricated).  
The design was trialled and finalised at Farnham, Surrey, with the prototype tested in sealed 
conditions in September 1956. Meanwhile designs for new radiation protected ROC Group 
HQs (to whom the individual posts would report their monitoring data, and who would then 
collate the regional and national pictures through triangulation) were also worked up, but 
construction works for these didn’t start until 1959. The construction of protected 
accommodation commenced in 1957, with the project eventually completed in 1965. 
Original plans intended to see 100 posts completed in the first year and 250 per year 
thereafter but completion rates ultimately scaled back through a combination of funding 
restrictions and the vagaries of land negotiations and on-site ground conditions.  
An early sign of hesitancy regarding the ROC posts and the civil defence commitment 
towards which they were a contribution was a £5 Million cut inflicted upon the works 
programme in May 1956 (as part of wider, and far more fundamental civil defence cuts – as 
civil defence became aligned to the British nuclear deterrent rather than to national 
recovery or even life-saving aspirations). Indeed the yet-to-be-built protected 
accommodation only survived these cuts at all because the monitoring function was part of 
the residual “control” function to which national civil defence planning had contracted, a 
system based upon attempted perpetuation of regional government structures and the 
warning of attack (and consequent fallout), for the ROC monitoring would provide an 
important element of the national deterrent – the ability to know that you have been 
attacked by your enemy.   
The pragmatism at the heart of the implementation of the protected accommodation 
project be has been traced through an examination of the Air Ministry’s individual site files 
for 100 English and Welsh ROC posts at the National Archives. There are approximately 600 
such files, with no clear reason explicable as to why files for some ROC post sites remain and 
others appear to have been destroyed. Some of the files present a coherent longitudinal 
history of a ROC post site from the late 1930s to the early 1980s, but these are the 
exception. Most of these files give limited foundational or operational information, and in 
many cases for only a short fraction of the particular site’s establishment. However, in the 
mundanity of their bureaucratic concerns (and their rarely present sense of impending 
nuclear war) these files are instructive by what they don’t tell us – by their silence and their 
prosaic preoccupations they show us what cold war ruralism looked like, and how for most 
practical purposes these were treated as just another unremarkable multi-site estate 
management comprised of rarely visited, rudimentarily points of presence spread across 
some 1,500 predominantly rural localities. 
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The files present evidence (checklists, standardised memos and the indicia of lines of 
reporting information). But different areas and sub-regions appear to have been affected to 
greater or lesser degrees by such requirements. The files lack a consistency which might 
suggest an effective central function specifying and then managing to enforce such 
reporting. At the individual site level even something as basic and surely certain as a site 
name is shown to be unstable and in flux across the period of many files, and at some even 
the accuracy of the National Grid Reference (NGR) map referencing of the site is doubted 
and corrected many years into the site’s existence. This is not to say that the ROC’s area HQ 
did not know where the post in question was, but rather it is to say that it knew where it 
actually was despite the official NGR being wrong. The files show that the most likely reason 
for someone eventually querying the accuracy of the NGR was the attempted visit to the 
site by someone with no prior, or local, knowledge of it.  
It is clear from the files that efforts were also made (in liaison with central government 
lawyers) to regularise landholdings for ROC post sites in the aftermath of the war. This to an 
extent shows signs of top-down systematisation, but on closer inspection the focus appears 
to have been on ensuring that the interest obtained (if leasehold) was no greater than 21 
years. There was no apparent attempt to impose a uniformity of annual rent (even though 
the plot of land taken in each case for the site was the same). Rents therefore were 
negotiated on an open market basis with the landowner, and on occasion – seemingly at the 
landowner’s instigation although this is not particularly clear from the files – occasionally 
outright ownership of the plots was taken. None of the files inspected indicated that any 
powers of requisition or compulsory purchase were ever used to acquire ROC post sites 
after the 1939-45 period. Indeed there were a number of files pointing to abortive attempts 
by the Ministry to acquire a site or to renew their rights of occupation there, the ROC post 
then having been vacated and moved elsewhere in the face of refusal by a landowner to 
grant or renew those rights.  
The Ministry’s preference for 21 year leases, rather than ownership in perpetuity at first 
glance seems rather strange, as it might be taken to imply that the threat of a nuclear war 
occurring would somehow have disappeared within 21 years. The reality however appears 
to be found first in the precariousness of the ROC’s existence, with the Home Office (as 
sponsor for the UKWMO) having to battle almost on an annual basis to protect the ROC in 
the face of the Treasury’s thirst for cuts, the Ministry of Defence’s ambivalence to anything 
associated with civil defence and also with a now rather luke-warm Air Ministry, who still 
had administrative responsibility for the ROC, but whose interest in it was waning as its 
aircraft-spotting role fell redundant, and the blast and fallout monitoring role imposed by 
the Home Office upon the ROC came to the fore. It also (and perhaps more importantly) 
signals this programme’s subordination of apocalyptic contingencies to the very present and 
pressing demands of standard estate management law and practice. Farmers would be 
aware that 21 years was the maximum duration of lease that could be granted before a 
greater level of security of tenure would be triggered. The Ministry’s approach was 
therefore working within the bounds of what would appear normal to a farmer in the 
ordinary course of land dealings: the nuclear dimension simply didn’t come into it.  
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A further sign of surrender to agricultural normalities was the variability of terms found 
within the agreed wording of leases and freehold conveyances. An extreme example can 
illustrate this point. A 1953 freehold conveyance for one ROC site purchase indicated that 
the purchaser (i.e. the Air Ministry) would have the right to bring livestock across the 
farmer’s land and onto the demised property. The prospect of the ROC post’s crew 
manhandling a pig or cow onto their lookout post is a false image. Those provisions had 
nothing to do with the operation of a site for monitoring the unfurling of cold war 
apocalypse, instead they were standard prudent terms for the purchaser of an otherwise 
landlocked portion of farmland to insist upon in normal agricultural circumstances
50
. This 
suggests that in the minds of both farmers and the Ministry’s land agents the prosaic 
practices and negotiating gambits of the agricultural community would be more to the fore 
in setting up or regularising ROC post plot ownership than would the exigencies of the end 
of the world. Indeed the (few) leases and freehold titles traced by this study
51
 contained 
little that was indicative of ROC posts’ exceptional contingent purpose, and everything that 
was characteristic of a generic and unexcited approach to rural land acquisition and estate 
management. 
Cold war ruralism’s pragmatism was also reflected in the decision to work with existing sites 
wherever possible (although some posts were relocated where post-war adjacent 
development, or adverse ground conditions were found to have rendered the existing sites 
unsuited to the installation there of the protected accommodation). This attempt to 
maximise the value of working within an existing provision had its limits however, for as at 
1955 the entirety of the UK was not actually covered by the existing network of lookout 
sites. The citing of the original posts had been dictated by a need to track aircraft coming 
from the south and the east, as was the case originally with German aircraft in the 1939-45, 
and Soviet atomic bombers in the early years of the cold war. This left gaps in the western 
flank of the British Isles (including Northern Ireland), which would need to be filled in order 
to achieve the uniformly nationwide observational capacity necessitated by the metrological 
vagaries of drifting fallout clouds. Accordingly, the ROC had to build a presence from scratch 
in these areas, as Wood has described, this entailed both securing sites and recruiting ROC 
volunteers, in each case a task requiring the characteristic pragmatism of “tact and native 
cunning”, and with the ROC officer tasked with this living in a: 
“single-berth sleeping van [in which he] averaged a complete tyre change 
every 10,000 miles and three broken springs a year; bad roads, snow, floods 
and local hospitality were normal occupational hazards…the west highlanders 
reacted favourably to a polite request but were adamant in the face of 
direction”.
52
   
This hardly fits the impression that we might otherwise have of a powerful, secretive state 
driving forward as an imperative a no-cost-spared centralised programme of national 
defence. Instead the impression, from this account, and from the files, is of a workaday, 
modest and at times impotent bureaucratic process. These posts did not require planning 
consent (due to a then applicable general exemption – not one related to national defence 
purposes – of state immunity from planning control) and there is accordingly very little 
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evidence of liaison with local government in the siting and upkeep of these posts. Instead 
the key determinative relationship appears to have been with the landowner (often a 
farmer) and establishing and maintaining ROC posts appears to have required considerable 
effort to keep these landowners happy.  
One file in particular emphasises this: a tenant farmer’s reply to a request that he vacate a 
portion of his land in order to make way for a subterranean ROC post, was that he was “only 
prepared to agree to this if he is given the right for himself and his family…to use the shelter 
in the event the necessity arising for them to seek protection from radio-active fall out”
53
. 
The ensuing internal ROC correspondence saw this question faithfully reported up the ROC’s 
chain of command in pursuit of an official determination of the farmer’s request. The 
eventual refusal was communicated back down that chain and onward to the farmer in 
surprisingly considerate terms, and with no hint that the request was impertinent. Incidents 
like this emphasise that the pattern (and balance of power between state and landowner) in 
roll-out of the ROC post protected accommodation programme shows nothing of the more 
centralised, and assertive, acquisition of farmland plots that (for example) Hefner
54
 has 
chronicled in her study of the establishment of the US’ Minuteman ballistic missile fields 
which saw 1,000 individual missile silos installed upon two acre plots spread out across tens 
of thousands of acres of Great Plains farmland between 1961 and 1967. 
Unlike the Orlit posts programme, for the protected accommodation there was no 
centralised production process – no supply of prefabricated parts – instead the protected 
accommodation was formed in poured concrete by local contractors, working to issued 
plans. Once built however, the files show instances of local adaptation to render a particular 
post better suited to its particular environment: some posts needed remedial works to 
address groundwater ingress, others needed extra security measures to guard against 
damage by marauding threats (but usually these were livestock or tractors, and less often 
scavengers, vandals or anti-nuclear protestors). Adaptation might also be necessary to keep 
the ROC crews happy: the need to keep these volunteers happy is a theme regularly 
recurring across the files, there being a fear from ROC officers that disenchantment from 
these volunteers would lead to there being insufficient staff to effectively man some posts, 
and thus gaps caused in the coverage of the national system due to failure to adequately 
address some localised water ingress, aggressive livestock, car parking or site access 
problem.  
This need to keep the some-time occupants of these sentinel structures happy, posed a 
problem not otherwise faced in equivalent unmanned monitoring networks (e.g. radar 
transmitters, microwave communication masts or relay stations). And the importance of the 
strength of a crew’s attachment to “its” ROC post should not be under-estimated. The files 
show that through weekend training exercises, and weekly crew meets these contingent 
places acted as local club-houses for their crews, with an ensuing sense of attachment to 
the sociality of performing these places. Whether this familiarity with the peacetime 
“clubhouse” nature of these chambers acted to support an appreciation of their apocalyptic 
purpose, or actually served to subvert it (and make ROC participation a pastime in its own 
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terms rather than a primary commitment to national defence in extremis) was ultimately 
never tested.  
Through local engagement by their ROC local volunteers and the Air Ministry’s occasional 
interactions with the bemused farmers who owned the fields that these small bunkers lay 
beneath, these posts and their unremarkable surface features became an obscure and half-
acknowledged part of their locality. ROC posts tended not to be hidden away in the 
“depths” of the countryside, it was a requirement of ROC post siting (relevant both to their 
1939-45 and cold war purpose) that they be located within ready access of those who 
manned them. Accordingly most posts were cited close to roads, and their presence 
indicated by a gate. Through this combination of their physical presence and the connection 
to local volunteers, these posts could never be secret as such. However, in the mundane 
form of their surface features, they could easily be mistaken for buried agricultural silos or 
water storage tanks, and this fortuitously lent them an easily unnoticeable appearance of 
just another piece of rural infrastructure.  
Conclusion 
UK studies of the cold war’s impact upon urban planning have tended to focus upon 
urbanism’s contribution to the cold war’s ideological contest, wherein “postwar urban 
planning became a battlefront in the cold war – a way to contain and secure cities against 
the threat of communism, and [to] offer a capitalist vision of the urban future…”
55
. Such 
scholarship has tended to elide the “war” element of the cold war, and thereby side-
stepped examination of the cold war’s planning-led response to the prospect of an all-out 
“hot war” conflict using city-destroying weapons of unprecedented power. This article has 
therefore sought to draw upon the North American cold war urbanism scholarship as a 
route by which to explore the UK experience of planning for, and/or building for, the impact 
of nuclear war upon the built environment.   
In doing so this article has sought to develop five key propositions about the UK’s 
experience of cold war urbanism – at least in so far as it can be witnessed through the ROC 
post protected accommodation scheme: first, that the cold war’s impact upon the built 
environment should not be assumed to be exclusively urban. Secondly, that cold war 
urbanism was characterised by two components: plan-making and bunker-building, and that 
in any national account of the strength or weakness of its cold war urbanism needs to 
comprise an assessment of each element and thirdly, that any analysis of cold war urbanism 
should include a concern to identify who – which professionals or other actors – were 
actually implicated in its plan-making and building. Thus the analysis presented here has 
shown how the UK’s relatively weak experience of cold war urbanism was predominantly 
rural in its footprint, that it did feature plan-making, but that that plan-making was almost 
exclusively done by central government civil defence planners rather than urban planners or 
architects. Furthermore, it has shown that in the UK relatively little of that plan-making 
resulted in any actual bunker-building.  
In considering a rare instance of actual cold war inspired bunker-building in the UK, the case 
study has also shown that in seeking to extend their reach into the countryside the UK’s civil 
22 
 
defence planners had to adapt their cold war imperatives to local ways and priorities in 
order to get their project accomplished and maintained. This suggests the fourth conclusion: 
that the formation of cold war urbanism in any national or project-related should be 
investigated as a potentially interpenetrating process, one which might be (as was the case 
with the protected accommodation project) as much exposed to the prospect of non-cold 
war priorities shaping its form, as of cold war needs shaping the practice of urban (or rural) 
planning and development.  
The case study’s analysis of the ROC bunker-building project has explained why that 
programme went ahead at a time when almost all other UK civil defence related efforts 
were being abandoned due to a combination of financial constraint and despair in the face 
of the revelation of the extent of the UK’s vulnerability, as a small densely populated island, 
to thermonuclear attack.  The dawn of the H-bomb (and the problem of fallout posed by it) 
marked the end of any hope of meaningfully providing a comprehensive plan for national 
recovery, or even co-ordinated life-saving. Instead, all the British state felt able to commit to 
in terms of civil defence after 1956 was the establishment of the ROC post warning and 
monitoring network and the construction of continuity of government bunkers (Regional 
Seats of Government and the ROC’s Sector HQs to which the ROC posts would have 
reported their data). And this would be achieved – as regards the ROC post element at least 
– via a pragmatic and modest repurposing of an existing national observation and warning 
network, achieved in a way that very much aspired to work within the grain of existing 
systems, utilising existing systems of law and land management in order to build and sustain 
the network and characterised by a work-a-day calmness that seems alien to the peril being 
modelled by the civil defence planners. 
The ROC files show how a desire for a national warning and monitoring system arising from 
planning-directed efforts to anticipate and prepare for the ultimate contingency, translated 
at local level into something more approximated and subordinated often to more pressing 
rural concerns and realities. The files show little sense of urgency to get the network 
established, and little mention of nuclear anxieties. Instead the paperwork portrays the 
project as just another multi-site infrastructural roll-out, or adaptation. At the level of 
implementation the character and problems of these sites were the problems of small land 
possessions or wayleaves held in support if infrastructural purposes in remote fields. The 
establishment and maintenance of the ROC post network at the height of the cold war 
presents then as just another set of mundane rural land administration problems, with the 
solutions guided by standard country ways of doing. This remarkably understated calm 
banality at the heart of the UK’s civil defence system, and the work-a-day tone of its 
implementers recalls Wakeman’s depiction of the reality gap between theorists and 
implementers:  
“while the planning avant-garde may have circulated a high urbanist 
discourse, it was diluted and transformed by a myriad of local practitioners 
who applied their own innovations, their own shambolic objects and rituals, 
and the technologies and material culture of their everyday lives.”
56
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This then was what cold war ruralism looked like. Instigated by the fundamental existential 
contingencies of nuclear war the ROC post programme diluted those abstractions, rendering 
them down into a familiarised and do-able ticking-over. Within this apocalyptic 
contingencies were subsumed within the mundane demands of the here-and-now, and its 
cows, farmers and mud. But cold war ruralism was not fundamentally a different way of 
doing than cold war urbanism, but rather a different intensity of the same thing. Thus the 
pragmatism shown to have been to the fore in cold war ruralism proved to be broadly 
effective as an adaptive strategy to achieve its civil defence aims (the roll out and manning 
of the ROC posts as a nationwide monitoring and reporting network), albeit through 
adoption of local, ad hoc and approximate methods. By 1965 the full network of 
underground monitoring posts had been built and were manned by the volunteers of the 
ROC. In that sense at least the pragmatic strategy had worked. 
However in 1968, only three years later, nearly half of the ROC posts (691) would suddenly 
be closed, as a consequence of the final abandonment of the UK civil defence system, in the 
face of a further financial crisis and the ensuing search for cuts. This brings us to our fifth 
and final point of conclusion: that attempts in the 1950s to address the ultimate 
contingency of nuclear war (particularly after the rise of the H-bomb) revealed the limits of 
positive planning and of the forecasting and forward-planning instincts otherwise in 
ascendency in the post-war era. As Jeff Hughes puts it: “in constructing their imaginary 
space of the thermonuclear apocalypse and after, the planners literally reached the limits of 
language – not just the indescribable, but also the unthinkable”
57
. The costs brought to the 
surface by such attempts to plan for nuclear war also exceeded the limits of affordability. 
The sheer scale of what would have been necessary – and in 1955 Strath had concluded that 
the only chance of substantive survival lay in “the transformation of the physical and social 
architecture of the country”
58
 – simply lay beyond reach.  
1968, coincidentally also marked the moment at which positive planning lost its confident 
grip upon urban and regional planning: as that year also saw the ascendancy of negative 
planning, with the 1968 Town & Country Planning Act declaring local plans to no longer be 
templates for public sector-led provisioning but instead re-designating them as guides for 
the scrutiny of private-sector led development. But it is perhaps more telling for the 
purposes of tracing the limits of the UK’s cold war urbanism to note that 1968 also saw the 
Home Office, following up in the wake of the civil defence cuts, emphasising to local 
authorities by Government Circular that their obligations to continue planning for civil 
defence under the Civil Defence Act 1948 remained extant. In doing so the Home Office 
sought to make clear that future civil defence activity should now: 
“consist primarily of planning how to raise the level of preparations should 
the circumstances demand it…rather than of making physical preparations 
against the contingency of an imminent war”
59
.  
In short: plan, but don’t build. This returns us to the fundamental fault line within cold war 
urbanism – one acknowledged in the North American studies, and certainly borne out in the 
case of this UK study – the gap between plan-making and the cold war related 
implementation or control of any actual development. As this article has shown, in the UK 
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context plan-making was hard enough, but proceeding to actual bunker-building was 
considerably harder still. 
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